Designing And Evaluating Next Generation Of Resilience Receivers

Abstract : The Galileo program is implementing enhancements with respect to standard GNSS services. Some of these enhancements relate to complementing the Galileo Open Service with Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) and providing signal authentication through the Commercial Service. These new features will improve resilience of the GNSS applications and reduce the likelihood of successful attacks to GNSS users. However, these upcoming Galileo services still require a step to be completed on the user side: the definition and implementation of algorithms to successfully exploit them. In this context, the European Commission launched the Navigation Authentication through Commercial Service-Enhanced Terminals (NACSET) project aiming at investigating and implementing techniques to detect and mitigate spoofing attacks, improving user-level resilience. As part of the NACSET project, a resilient user terminal has been developed based on a high-end multi-GNSS receiver. This GNSS receiver is complemented with a software module that implements several protection techniques that exploit Galileo authentication. This module includes standalone techniques such as direction of arrival estimation, clock monitoring, IMU hybridization, AGC-C/N0 monitoring, a navigation message authentication (NMA) module and an anti-replay technique based on the use of NMA unpredictable symbols. This paper focuses on the proposed anti-replay technique. While plenty of literature is already available on GNSS spoofing and replay attacks [2] [6] , most of the research available is based theoretical models and simulations. The paper details a hardware and software implementation of anti-replay capabilities in a real high-end receiver in order to complement the existing work. The implementation is then tested in real time against a simulated attack implemented explicitly for the technique validation. Results and conclusions are derived and presented.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
ITSNT 2018, International Technical Symposium on Navigation and Timing, Oct 2018, Toulouse, France. 〈10.31701/itsnt2018.21〉
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Contributeur : Laurence Porte <>
Soumis le : mercredi 5 décembre 2018 - 10:33:18
Dernière modification le : lundi 7 janvier 2019 - 10:54:36




Simón Cancela, Javier Navarro, David Calle, Eckart Göhler, Andrea Dalla Chiara, et al.. Designing And Evaluating Next Generation Of Resilience Receivers. ITSNT 2018, International Technical Symposium on Navigation and Timing, Oct 2018, Toulouse, France. 〈10.31701/itsnt2018.21〉. 〈hal-01942249v1〉



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