A note on quantity precommitment, Cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs

Nicolas Gruyer (1)

1 LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien

This paper extends Kreps and Scheinkman's 1983 result, which shows that a production capacity choice stage followed by price competition yields the same outcome as a Cournot game, to a setting where capacity costs are asymmetric.

Mots clés: asymmetric costs; Bertrand competition; capacity; Kreps-Scheinkman

Domaines: Economies et finances

Nicolas Gruyer. A note on quantity precommitment, Cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs. Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29 (1), pp 384-391. ⟨hal-01021567⟩