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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Industrial Economics Année : 2009

Optimal auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders

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Résumé

I consider optimal auctions for a seller who is bound to sell a single item to one of two potential buyers, organized as " well-coordinated " cartel. I show that, even though the seller cannot deter collusion, he can optimally accommodate it by employing a simple mechanism which imposes an inefficient allocation on the bidders unless they pay a sufficiently high amount to avoid it.
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Dates et versions

hal-01021568 , version 1 (17-07-2014)

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Nicolas Gruyer. Optimal auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2009, 57 (4), pp 835-850. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00397.x⟩. ⟨hal-01021568⟩

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