Platform Competition: Market Structure and Pricing

Claire Borsenberger (1) , Helmuth Cremer (2) , Denis Joram (1) , Jean-Marie Lozachmeur (3, 4) , Estelle Malavolti (5, 3)

1 Groupe La Poste
2 TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics
3 TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics
4 CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
5 ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile

The significant development of e-commerce and Internet marketplaces has provided numerous benefits to both retailers and customers. In addition, it has been a boon for delivery operators, allowing postal services to compensate at least in part revenue losses due to declining mail volumes. However, increasing concentration in e-commerce and the worry that market power may be extended into adjacent markets has turned into a major concern of policy makers and competition authorities. While many argue that traditional regulatory or competition policy may have to be amended within the context of platforms, there are so far few rigorous studies that can provide guidance.

Mots clés: Foreclosure; E-commerce; Delivery operators; Vertical integration; Bundling

Domaines: Sciences de l'Homme et Société; Economies et finances

Claire Borsenberger, Helmuth Cremer, Denis Joram, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, Estelle Malavolti. Platform Competition: Market Structure and Pricing. The Changing Postal Environment, Springer, pp.225-240, 2020, Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, 978-3-030-34531-0. ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-34532-7_17⟩. ⟨hal-02888569⟩