Communication and binary decisions : is it better to communicate ?

Abstract : We study information transmission between an informed expert and an uninformed decision-maker when the decision is binary and the expert does not have a systematic bias. Whenever an equilibrium exists where the decision is delegated to the expert, it is ex ante Pareto-dominant. Adding a round of multilateral communication does not improve information transmission. The decision-maker can, however, improve information transmission by communicating sequentially with two experts. However, introducing multiple rounds of communication (i.e., allowing for rebuttal) does not help.
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Submitted on : Friday, October 18, 2013 - 4:55:48 PM
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Frédéric Loss, Estelle Malavolti, Thibaud Vergé. Communication and binary decisions : is it better to communicate ?. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Mohr Siebeck, 2013, 169 (3), pp 451-467. ⟨10.1628/093245613X13621221166330⟩. ⟨hal-00874852⟩

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