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The ex ante α-core for normal form games with uncertainty

Abstract : In this paper we study the existence of the α-core for an n-person game with incomplete information. We follow a Milgrom-Weber-Balder formulation of a game with incomplete information. The players adopt behavioral strategies represented by Young measures. The game unrolls in one step at the ex ante stage. In this context, the mixed-extensions of the utility functions are not quasi-concave, and as a result the classical Scarf's theorem cannot be applied. An approximation argument is used to overcome this lack of concavity.
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Youcef Askoura, Mohammed Sbihi, Hamid Tikobaini. The ex ante α-core for normal form games with uncertainty. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2013, 49 (2), pp 157-162. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.01.007⟩. ⟨hal-00924267⟩

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