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Extended Verification of Secure UAANET Routing Protocol

Abstract : UAV Ad hoc Network (UAANET) is a wireless ad hoc network composed of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Ground Control Station (GCS). It requires an efficient and secure routing protocols to find accurate and secure route between nodes to exchange data traffics. There have been several secure routing proposals to ensure data authentication and integrity services of ad hoc routing protocols. However, most of them are vulnerable against wormhole attacks and therefore cannot be used for UAANET directly without amendment. The wormhole attack involves two attackers who perform a colluding attack. In this paper, we present a new UAANET secure routing protocol called SUAP (Secure Uav Ad hoc routing Protocol). It ensures message authentication and provides detection and prevention of wormhole attacks. SUAP is a reactive protocol using public key cryptography, hash chains and geographical leashes. We have carried out a formal verification analysis of SUAP security properties using the AVISPA tool, an automated model checker for the analysis of security features. We have also validated our security proposal through formal model checking using Simulink and Stateflow tools. Additionally, we use a hybrid experimental system (based on virtual machines and a virtual mesh framework) under a realistic UAANET scenario to evaluate SUAP routing performances and validate its security properties.
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Contributor : Laurence Porte <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, September 13, 2016 - 6:01:57 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, July 24, 2019 - 11:50:44 PM
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  • HAL Id : hal-01365933, version 1

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Jean-Aimé Maxa, Mohamed-Slim Ben Mahmoud, Nicolas Larrieu. Extended Verification of Secure UAANET Routing Protocol. DASC 2016, 35th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, Sep 2016, Sacramento, United States. ⟨hal-01365933⟩

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